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Willis: Of [Im]permissible Illogic and Section 1031

OF [IMIPERMISSIBLE ILLOGIC
AND SECTION 1031*
STEVEN J. WILLIS*

"Tax Law is law unto itself. There are no equities in tax law. And
there is an area of permissible illogic in tax law."'
PRELIMINARY ExcURSUS

Can it be true, as the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit tells us, that
Congress intended a law which is harsh, inequitable, and illogical?2 Could
3
Congress possibly have meant that only taxpayers with sophisticated advice
4
should have the advantages of section 103l? We all would hope not as to both
questions. The courts, however, seem so confused with regard to whether form
OTextual editing of this work was limited due to author objections.
"*Assistant Professor of Law, University of Florida; J.D., 1977, Louisiana State University;
LL.M. (Taxation), 1980, New York University.
The author acknowledges the valuable assistance of Cory Peterson, a member of the
Florida Bar, and LL.M. (Taxation) candidate at the University of Florida, in the preparation
of this article.
1. United States v. Henderson Clay Prods., 324 F.2d 7, 12 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied,
377 U.S. 917 (1963). The statement is painfully true but perhaps too casually accepted by
the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. E.g., Swaim v. United States, 651 F.2d 1066, 1071
(5th Cir. 1981); Estate of Dupree v. United States, 391 F.2d 753, 758 (5th Cir. 1968); Carlton
v. United States, 385 F.2d 238, 243 (5th Cir. 1967); Fears v. United States, 886 F. Supp. 1223,
1227 (N.D. Ga. 1975).
2. While the court is never so brash as to claim that Congress intended the law to be
unfair, the court does claim: (1) that Congress intended the result which the court imposes
and (2) that the result is "obviously harsh." Swaim v. United States, 651 F.2d at 1071; Carlton
v. United States, 385 F.2d 238, 243. Cf. Bell Lines, Inc. v. United States, 480 F.2d 710, 714 (4th
Cir. 1973) (noting that the cases in the area are "hopelessly conflicting"); Barker v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 555, 561 (1980) (describing the analytical problem posed by the exchange
requirement of section 1031); Biggs v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 905, 919 (1978), afi'd, 632 F.2d
1171 (5th Cir. 1980) (distinguishing yet recognizing Carlton's harsh result).
3. Two Tax Court decisions, which are the focus of this paper, decry the requirement of
an artful transaction. See Brauer v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 1134, 1146 (1980); Biggs v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 905, 918 (1978); accord Coupe v. Commissioner, 52 T.C. 394, 414 (1969)
(Simpson, J., concurring). Nevertheless, numerous cases have required an admittedly unnatural adherence to form. E.g., Swaim v. United States, 651 F.2d 1066, 1070-71 (5th Cir. 1981);
Barker v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 555, 561 (1980); Carlton v. United States, 385 F.2d 238, 241-43
(5th Cir. 1967). Cf. Coupe, 52 T.C. at 416 (Raum, J., dissenting) (arguing for greater adherence to form); Rogers v. Commissioner, 44 T.C. 126, 136 (1965) (arguing for strict form
without noting the inequities involved). See generally Rev. Rul. 297, 1977-2 C.B. 304.
4. I.R.C. § 1031(a) provides: "No gain or loss shall be recognized if property held for
productive use in a trade or business or for investment ... is exchanged solely for property of
a like kind to be held either for productive use in a trade or business or for investment."
For a brief overview of I.R.C. § 1031 and the purpose behind it, see infra text accompanying notes 14-20. Readers unfamiliar with tax law in general or I.R.C. § 1031 in particular
might benefit by reading the articles cited infra note 6.
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or substance5 controls like-kind exchanges that we live in an illogical system in
which taxpayers and courts must sometimes act unnaturally to achieve what
Congress has clearly intended. Surely we can do better. This paper will attempt
to elucidate how we can begin.
First I wish to state what this article is not: it is not another comprehensive
discussion of section 1031 - that has been done, both frequently and very
well. 6 Also, it is not simply an argument for new congressional policy allowing
both the use of cash and time in a 1031 exchange. Other commentators have
already argued the case for new legislation allowing taxpayers first to sell their
property for cash and then to postpone reinvestment for a stated period of
time, without being forced to recognize gain on the transaction7 While such
new policy may be advisable, it has, thus far, not been accepted.
As a result, this paper will instead focus upon the present statute and upon
the present confused jurisprudence regarding the use of cash under section
1031. Bluntly, the question considered is: "may taxpayers, under present law,
sell property for cash, reinvest the proceeds, and still qualify under section 1031
as having fulfilled the requirement of an exchange." The very asking of the
question is revolutionary; nevertheless, this paper will demonstrate that it is
not only an acceptable question, but also that the answer to it is yes. That
answer is based upon the sensible implementation of present congressional
policy as a replacement of the present practice of permissible illogic.
Of Legal Theory, Statutory Law and Taxes
The root of the problem lies in a legal theory expressed by many United
States courts and quite cogently by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit:
s
"[Tjhe tax law is statutory, and equitable considerations are inapplicable."
The error was not in denominating tax law as statutory but rather in disclaiming the presence of equity, logic, reason, natural law, and above all, common
sense as elements of statutory law. The court was certainly correct in indicating
that statutes speak for themselves and must, at least preliminarily, be read
9
literally. The court even recognized the partial non-sense of section 1031.
Unfortunately, the court also chose a literal application of the statute in a

5. Compare Brauer v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 1134, 1143 (1980) (stressing that substance
controls) with Barker v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 566 (1980) (stressing that form is paramount).
6. See, e.g., Dallman, Satisfying the "Exchange" Requirement in Simultaneous Multiparty 1031 Deals, 56 J. TAX'N 74 (1982); Bryce, Deferred Exchanges: Nonrecognition Transactions After Starker, 56 TuL. L. REv. 42 (1981); Guerin, A Proposed Test for Evaluating
Multiparty Like Kind Exchanges, 35 TAX L. REV. 545 (1980) (an excellent discussion of
I.R.C. § 1031); Levun & Gehring, Like Kind Exchanges: Is Simultaneity a Requirement?, 34
TAX LAW. 119 (1980).

7. E.g., Comment, Tax-Free Exchanges of Like Kind Investment or Business Property: A
Proposal for Legislative Revision of Internal Revenue Code Section 1031, 53 S. CAL. L. REv.
355 (1979); Comment, Section 1031 Exchanges: Step Transaction Analysis and the Need for
Legislative Amendment, 24 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 351 (1976).
8. Commissioner v. Dodd, 410 F.2d 132, 134 (5th Cir. 1969).
9. See Biggs v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 905, 918 (1978). See also authorities cited supra
note 3.
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situation for which it makes no reasonable sense. 10 The world's many civil law
jurisdictions,11 with statutory experience spanning the millenia, have learned
the dangers of such literal readings. They have long discredited the notion
that statutory law contains no element of equity, for indeed it does." A fundamental precept of this paper will be that it is not only appropriate, but also
imperative to consider the sense, equity, and the purpose of a statute - even a
tax statute.
An additional premise of this paper involves the term "caselaw" - a shorthand expression for the principle, espoused by so many courts, that judges are
bound to follow precedent. The notion, while basic to a common law system,
is contrary to civil law theories. In a civil law jurisdiction, the theory of
jurisprudence constante prevails, which provides generally that cases might
give significant guidance, albeit something less than law.' 3 The failure to make
10. The courts often cogenily explain the problems with § 1031 and then proceed to
apply it literally. See, e.g., Swaim v. United States, 651 F.2d 1066, 1071 (5th Cir. 1981); Carlton
v. United States, 385 F.2d 238, 243 (5th Cir. 1967); Barker v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. at 555,
561 (1980).
11. Although the majority of United States jurisdictions operate under the English
common law system, most of the world has always preferred civil law. Perhaps the consistent
jurisprudential errors regarding the use of equity in tax law result from a misunderstanding
of statutory law and inappropriate use of "caselaw." See infra notes 12 & 18.
12. In 1 J. DOMAT, THE CIVIL LAW IN ITS NATURAL ORDER 31 (1850), Dr. Domat explains
why it is necessary to interpret laws: "[I]t [also] happens that the sense of a law, how clear
soever it may appear in the words, would lead us to false consequences, and to decisions that
would be unjust, if the laws were indifferently applied to everything that is contained within
the expression. For, in this case, the palpable injustice that would follow from this apparent
sense obliges us to discover by some kind of interpretation, not what the law says, but what
it means; and to judge by its meaning how far it ought to be extended, and what are the
bounds that ought to be set to its sense."
Another commentator further explained: "To be more specific, situations not foreseen by
the law-maker should always be governed by another text of the law, or a superior principle
of equity." 1 M. PLAINIOL, TRArri: ELEMENTAIRE DE DROIT, CIVIL 217 (12th ed. 1939).
Relying upon an interesting explanation by Fenet, Professor Yntema makes the same observation - that civil law contains elements of natural law and equity, although they are less
institutionalized than in common law: "Si la loi parle, if faut juger en se cau formant ,i sa
volont6. Si elle setait, if faut juger encore, mais avec cette difference que, lorsqu'il s'agit d'une
affaire civile, les juges doivent se determiner par les rlgles de l'6quit6, qui consistent dans les
maximes de droit naturel, de justice universelle et de raison .... " Yntema, Equity in the Civil
Law and the Common Law, 15 AM. J. COMP. L. 60, 80 (1966) (quoting P. FENar, 6 RECUEIL
COMPLET DES

TRAVAUX PREPARATOIRES DU CODE CIVIL

387-88 (1827)).

A translation of the above passage is: "If the law speaks, it is necessary to decide in conformity with its message. If it falls silent, it is necessary to decide as well, but with the difference that whenever it is a civil affair, the judge must decide by rules of equity, consistent with
maxims of natural law, universal justice and reason."
Thus the message from these four civilians, as well as from others, is that statutes must be
read literally, but with the caveat that whenever they are unclear, harsh, or inconsistent with
legislative intent, and particularly when they are all three (as is the case with I.R.C. § 1031),
the judge can and must appeal to notions of natural law.
13. Professor Plainiol explains the French notion of jurisprudence constante: "The decisions of the United Chambers of the Court of Cassation are binding only upon the last
court to which the case is recommitted and solely in that instance. The latter court is free to
adopt a different view in other instances. Decisions of the United Chambers, nevertheless,
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the distinction between binding precedent and prestigious opinion, I believe,
results in unfortunate errors in the field of taxation. Courts tend to act, sometimes harshly, not out of logic and law but rather out of an unfortunate
deification of their forebears.
I acknowledge that most authorities, including most judges, consider the
United States to be thoroughly a common law jurisdiction. Because I find no
such requirement in the Constitution, I disagree with that assumption and
suggest one of my own - that our tax system is better understood in the context of civilian theories. This, of course, is only a premise, and is, for now,
only the subject of an excursus; in the future, it might appropriately be the
subject of a separate dissertation.
INTRODUCTION

Section 1031 provides for the nonrecognition of realized gains and losses
resulting from the exchange of like-kind trade, business or investment properties. The section differs from some other nonrecognition provisions which
require neither the continuity nor the immediacy of an exchange. 4 For example, section 1033 allows a taxpayer who has suffered an involuntary conversion of appreciated property into cash to delay recognition of the gain
realized on the conversion if he reinvests the cash in similar property within
two years.1 5 Congress obviously views such taxpayers sympathetically and due
the time-lag in which to reinvest. 16 Perhaps misguidedly,27 but nevertheless
unambiguously, Congress chose not to allow such a time-lag for taxpayers
opting's under section 1031.
In most like-kind exchanges, the intent and the words of Congress mesh
perfectly and work smoothly. Taxpayer A transfers property to taxpayer B and
in return receives like-kind property. That, without doubt, is an exchange.
Alternatively, taxpayer A might sell his property for cash and then later rehave great prestige. They stabilize the law because there is little chance that the Court of
Cassation will subsequently reverse its own decision after such a solemn examination. Judges
of first instance and of appeal thus willingly or unwillingly yield to its opinion." 1 M. PLAINIoL,
TRArrE ELEMENTAIRE DR DRorr, CIVIL 204 (12th ed. 1939).
14. See I.R.C. § 1033 (1976) (involuntary conversions); I.R.C. § 1034 (1976 & Supp. I 1977)
(roll-over of gain on sale of residence); I.R.C. § 1039 (1976) (certain sales of low-income housing

projects).
15. I.R.C. § 1033(a)(2)(B)(i) (1976). The two-year period begins at the dose of the year
in which the conversion occurred. The statute also provides for a three-year period for certain
condemned property. I.R.C. § 1033(g)(4) (Supp. II 1978).
16. Cf., e.g., H.R. REP. No. 586, 82d Cong., Ist Sess. 108-10 (1951)

(discussing section
112(n)(1) of the 1939 Code, a predecessor to I.R.C. § 1033), reprinted in 1951 U.S. CODE CONG,
& AD. NEws 1896-1901; 97 CONG. REc. 6891 (1951) (remarks of Congressman Doughton); 97
CONG. REc. 11721 (1951) (remarks of Senator Long).
17. See supra note 7; Biggs v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 905, 918 n.5.
18. Commentators generally present I.R.C. § 1031 as a mandatory (non-elective) provision,
see, e.g., B. BrrrKEo
S. LEIMBERG, & M.

& L. STONE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 589 (5th ed. 1980); A. PARKER,
INCOME TAX LAw 13-22 (1981);

SATINSKY, STANLEY & KILCULLEN'S FEDERAL

Note, Income Tax Consequences of Nonsimultaneous Exchanges of Like-Kind Property, 55
N.Y.U. L. REv. 581, 596-97 (1980). Practice, however, has shown the amazing ease with which
the section can be avoided or exploited.
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invest the cash in similar property. That, despite the ultimate continuity of
investment, is not an exchange and was not intended by Congress to be one.' 9
Beyond those simple examples, however, the word "exchange" has very
little meaning. Taxpayers, acting under the sanction of jurisprudence constante, have, with the use of mirrors, learned to disguise the alternative (nonexchange) transaction as the original simple exchange. They have even managed to introduce a significant element of time-lag. The mirrors used to
perform this magic are known as two sophisticated but common devices: threecorner deals and Starker20 exchanges. This paper will examine those devices in
light of congressional intent. and the unfortunate attempts of the judiciary to
give meaning to a now meaningless word: exchange.
Of Three-CornerDeals;
Agents-Who-are-not-Agents;
and Fantasy
Frequently, taxpayer A, who desires nonrecognition treatment, finds a
potential purchaser, B, with nothing but cash with which to acquire A's property. A also locates seller C who holds property A wants but who wishes to
receive cash. For years, courts have told us A cannot expect 1031 treatment if
he sells to B and purchases from C, for that would not be an exchange. 21 A can,
22
however, arrange for B to purchase from C, often with money provided by A,
and then exchange with B. Never mind that the two transactions are substantively the same - courts and practitioners find something magic in Congress' choice of the word exchange.23
When, as often happens, problems arise with financing, 24 security,25 or defective title, 26 party B may become so nervous that he balks at the deal. Since A
19. See, e.g., Carlton v. United States, 385 F.2d 238, 241 (5th Cir. 1967); Guerin, supra
note 6, at 557-60. The above authorities assert that even an immediate reinvestment of cash
will not qualify; however, I believe, as apparently did the Tax Court in Biggs and Brauer,
that an immediate reinvestment is fine and that perhaps only a substantially delayed one will
preclude the use of § 1031. See infra proposals in the Conclusion; but see infra text accompanying note 93.
20. Starker v. United States, 602 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1979) (commonly known as Starker
II); Starker v. United States, 432 F. Supp. 864 (D. Ore. 1975) (commonly known as Starker I).
See also [Bruce] Starker v. United States, 35 A.F.T.R. 2d 75-1550 (D. Ore. 1975) (not commonly cited, but interesting). See infra text accompanying notes 30-35.
21. See, e.g., Carlton v. United States, 385 F.2d 238, 241 (5th Cir. 1967).
22. See, e.g., Biggs v. Commissioner, 632 F.2d 1171, 1173 (5th Cir. 1980), aff'g 69 T.C.
905, 916 (1978); Brauer v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 1134, 1137 (1980); Barker v. Commissioner,
74 T.C. 555, 563 (1980); 124 Front Street, Inc. v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 6, 18 (1975); Dallman,
supra note 6, at 77 n.23; Guerin, supra note 6, at 608-10.
23. See, e.g., Swaim v. United States, 651 F.2d 1066, 1071 (5th Cir. 1981); Carlton v.
United States, 385 F.2d 238, 241 (5th Cir. 1962); Barker v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 555, 565-66
(1980); Rogers v. Commissioner, 44 T.C. 126, 136 (1965); Guerin, supra note 6, at 634. See
infra text accompanying note 93.
24. See supra note 22.
25. While party A may be willing to finance the acquisition, he may be more secure
doing so through an agent than through party B. Cf. authorities cited inIra note 27.
26. If title to the property is in doubt, B might be understandably uncomfortable in
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needs the fiction of an exchange, and since he must never, never touch cash,
even momentarily, he utilizes D, a strawman, to form a four-corner transaction.27 D (often using A's moneyl) purchases C's property, exchanges with A
and then sells what was A's property to B. Everyone is happy and the fiction
of an exchange is preserved. Again, never mind that D is in reality A's agent
and that the transaction is the same as a sale and immediate reinvestment (or
vice versa), for the courts remarkably insist that he and it are not.2 8 Pity the poor taxpayer, however, who momentarily touches cash or its
equivalent, for he thwarts congressional intent. Unfair, inequitable, and illogical? Yes, admit the courts, but it was Congress which chose the word exchange, and we all know that unambiguous statutes are to be read literally
without an appeal to reason.29
Of Starker and Bank-Accounts-Which
Are-Not-Bank-Accounts
Occasionally, A and B find each other but cannot locate replacement property for A. Since A must not sell to B and then wait, perhaps years, to reinvest,
he typically transfers his property in exchange for B's promise to someday
deliver a like-kind asset. In. the simplest form of the deal, A receives nothing
but B's unsecured promise. Most people, 0 apparently not including the Service31 at least cautiously believe that receipt of such a promise does not trigger
realization of income. As a result, there is, at that point, no reason to consider
whether any income is to be non-recognized, because there is, as yet, no income.3 2 If all goes well, B ultimately locates suitable property, transfers it to A,
allowing title to pass through his hands, even momentarily. See, e.g., Brauer v. Commissioner,

1134,1137 (1980).
27. E.g., Biggs v. Commissioner, 632 F.2d 1171, 1173 (5th Cir. 1980); Barker v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 555, 556 (1980); Coupe v. Commissioner, 52 T.C. 394, 405 (1969); Guerin,
supra note 6, at 553-54. See Rogers v. Commissioner, 44 T.C. 126 (1965) (taxpayers used a
fourth man but lost anyway because they received cash).
28. E.g., Biggs v. Commissioner, 632 F.2d 1171, 1178 (5th Cir. 1980), aff'g 69 T.C. 905,
917 (1978); Coupe v. Commissioner, 52 T.C. 394, 405 (1980); Barker v. Commissioner, 74
T.C. 555, 565 (1980); J.H. Baird Publishing Co. v. Commissioner, 39 T.C. 608, 615-16 (1962);
Guerin, supra note 6, at 590-603.
29. See supra text accompanying note 8.
30. See, e.g., Fowler & Wyndelts, How Use of a Trust Enhances the Section 1031 Nonsimultaneous Real Estate Exchange, 53 J. TAX'N 22 (1980); Levun & Gehring, supra note 6;
Note, supra note 18, at 596-97; Note, Nonsimultaneous Like-Kind Exchanges Under Section
1031 of the InternalRevenue Code, 56 TEx. L. Rav. 1271 (1978).
31. See Ltr. Rul. 7938087 (June 22, 1979), reconsidered in Ltr. Rul. 8005049 (Nov. 8,
1979), and retroactively revoked in Ltr. Rul. 8046122 (Aug. 25, 1980).
32. Although some commentators argue that the issue is recognition, it should be
analyzed as one of realization because a taxpayer in a Starker exchange receives an unsecured
promise which is not a cash equivalent and thus has no measurable amount realized. Because
it is thus premature to find realization of income, the recognition issue of § 1031 is not
relevant. See Jones v. Commissioner, 524 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1975); Cowden v. Commissioner,
289 F.2d 20 (5th Cir. 1961); Fowler & Wyndelts, supra note 30, at 22; Guerin, supra note 6, at
625-27; Note, supra note 30, at 1271; Note, supra note 18, at 583. But see Byrce, supra note 6,
at 67; Levun &Gehring, supra note 6, at 135-36.
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and thus fulfills his obligation. That, the theory goes, completes an exchange,
albeit non-simultaneous.
More adventuresome but less trusting33 taxpayers seek more than B's mere
promise: they assuage their delay-generated nervousness by demanding security.
34
Bolder still, some taxpayers in A's position insist upon an escrow account,
and others even dare to demand the right to receive cash at their option if
suitable property is not located 5 As yet, no court has approved these bolder
transactions; apparently, however, some practitioners have.38
OF CHANGE, HOWEVER BRiEF

With that background, a 1978 Tax Court case, Biggs v. Commissioner,7
subsequently affirmed by the Fifth Circuit, 38 and a 1980 Tax Court decision,
Brauer v. Commissioner,39 changed the picture significantly. In each instance,
the judges seemed to recognize the lack of meaning in the requirement of a
literal exchange, 40 and astonishingly, both courts allowed cash to flow through
A's hands.41 In each case, the tax court relied heavily upon the taxpayer's immediate continuity of investment as fullfilling congressional intent rather than
upon the magic of a formalistic exchange. 42 Also, both tax court judges claimed
that, in section 1031 transactions, substance controls over form; 43 incredibly,
neither even mentioned that such a claim represents a significant (and refreshing) change. 44 Regrettably, it was not to last.
88. Less trusting in the sense that they do not trust B's unsecured promise to deliver
like-kind property. Fowler & Wyndelts, supra note 80, at 28; cf. Ltr. Rul. 7988087 (June 22,
1979).
84. Cf. Ltr. Rul. 7938087 (June 22, 1979). The result, of course, is to cause a realization
under either the cash equivalency doctrine or the economic benefit theory, and thus to precipitate a recognition issue. See authorities cited supra note 82. See Rev. Rul. 31, 1960-1 C.B.
174, 178-79.
35. Fowler & Wyndelts, supra note 80, at 28; Levun & Gehring, supra note 6, at 141-42
(cautioning against giving the taxpayer such an option). T.J. Starker had no such right.
Starker v. United States, 602 F.2d 1841, 1848 (9th Cir. 1979).
86. See, e.g., Starker v. United States, 602 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1979).
37. 69 T.C. 905 (1978), aff'd, 632 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1980).
88. The Court of Appeals approved the Biggs transaction and thus did not require a
literal exchange. Unclear, however, is whether the court fully understood the complex Biggs
facts and thus the radical nature of its holding. See infra text accompanying notes 70-79.
89. 74 T.C. 1184 (1980), appeal dismissed, (1981) 10 STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH) 1170,705
(8th Cir. 1981).
40. See Brauer,74 T.C. at 1146; Biggs, 69 T.C. at 918.
41. See Biggs, 632 F.2d at 1178, 69 T.C. at 919; Brauer,74 T.C. at 1146.
42. See Brauer,74 T.C. at 1144 n.7; Biggs, 69 T.C. at 914, 918.
48. See Biggs, 69 T.C. at 914 ("The starting point of our analysis is the well established
principle that the substance of a transaction, rather than the form in which it is cast,
ordinarily determines its tax consequences."). Brauer, 74 T.C. at 1145 ("[U]nder Biggs, substance should control ....").
44. What the Biggs court describes as "well-established" is a principle common to tax
law in general (and to § 1081 in particular) when the government chooses to assert it
but not, as Biggs suggests, at the taxpayer's behest. 69 T.C. at 914. See also Smith v. Commissioner, 587 F.2d 972 (8th Cir. 1976); Commissioner v. Danielson, 878 F.2d 771 (3d Cir.
1967), cert. denied, 889 U.S. 858 (1967). Unfortunately, Judge Simpson, in Brauer, incorrectly
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Shortly thereafter, Barker v. Commissioner,45 Swaim v. United States4 6 and
Milbrew, Inc. v. Commissioner,47 emanating from the same courts as Biggs and
Brauer,reverted to the world of make-believe, as if no change had occurred.
None mentioned Brauer and each only obliquely mentioned Biggs. 48 While
Barker might be justifiable on its facts, 49 the reversion of both courts to permissible illogic as an approach to section 1031 is not encouraging. A beginning,
however, occurred with Biggs and Brauer, and that is indeed very encouraging.
Of Biggs
Franklin Biggs owned real property in Maryland which he wished to sell
for cash plus a less valuable tract in Virginia. Naturally he desired nonrecognition treatment to the extent he exchanged land for land."0 A problem
arose because Powell, the intended exchange partner,51 was "either unable or
unwilling to take title to the Virginia property." 52 To facilitate the exchange,
and apparently intending a four-corner deal,53 Biggs arranged to have a corporation which he financed-l and his attorney controlled- acquire the Virginia
title. Another corporation, Ocean View, eventually acquired Powell's rights."e
The scene was thus set for the completion of a traditional four-corner r7
relies upon Smith as authority for claiming that substance always controls 1031 transactions,
regardless who asserts it. 74 T.C. at 1144 n.7. See the discussion of Smith infra text accompanying notes 100-102.
Both Biggs and Brauer also rely upon Alderson v. Commissioner, 317 F.2d 790 (9th Cir.
1963), which applied the substance over form doctrine, at the taxpayer's urging, to § 1031
as long ago as 1963. The Alderson court relied heavily upon the taxpayer's original intent to
effect an exchange and upon the ultimate continuity of investment. 317 F.2d at 792-95. Until
Biggs and Brauer,Alderson stood alone for this proposition. Cf. Meyer v. Commissioner, 58
T.C. 311, 315 (1972) (Dawson, J., dissenting) (citing Alderson in a 1031 case, but failing to
distinguish between an argument by the government and one by the taxpayer). It has, however, been cited frequently on other issues.
45. 74 T.C. 555 (1980).
46. 651 F.2d 1066 (5th Cir. 1981), aif'g 79-2 U.S. TAX CAs. 9462 (D.N.D. 1979). Interestingly, Swaim arose from a district court rather than the Tax Court.
47. 42 T.C.M. (CCH) 1467 (1981).
48. Swaim v. United States, 651 F.2d 1066, 1070 (5th Cir. 1981); Milbrew v. Commissioner,
42 T.C.M. (CCII) 1467, 1489 (1981). The Barker court cited Biggs seven times but never discussed its relevance. 74 T.C. at 562, 563 (twice), 564,565,565 n.4, & 566 n.5.
49. See infra text accompanying notes 125-35.
50. 632 F.2d at 1172-73; 69 T.C. at 914-15.
51. The term "exchange partner" is not original to this article, but rather, has been
utilized previously as a convenient shorthand. See, e.g., Guerin, supra note 6, at 548.
52. 69 T.C. at 908.
53. See supra text accompanying note 27.
54. 632 F.2d at 1174, 69 T.C. at 909, 916. See supra text accompanying note 22.
55. 632 F.2d at 1173, 69 T.C. at 907-08.
56. Four months after contracting with Biggs, Powell transferred his rights to acquire the
Maryland property to two individuals. Three months later, those transferees sold their rights
to Ocean View at a substantial profit. 632 F.2d at 1174-75; 69 T.C. at 909-10.
57. Another party - the seller of the replacement property and the fourth corner - sold
to the corporation early and thus was no longer important. Two others - the original exchange partner and his transferee - also played minor roles; thus the deal was actually one
with six corners. Id.
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deal involving Biggs, Ocean View, and Biggs' attorney's corporation (acting as
an agent-who-is-not-an-agent5s). Rather than complete the deal as planned,
however, Biggs strangely acquired the Virginia title directly from his attorney's
corporation. In exchange Biggs cancelled a loan he had made to the corporation.59 Ocean View, as well, gave Biggs a quitclaim deed to the property; however, all parties involved were well aware that Ocean View never had any right
in the Virginia land whatsoever - not even an option or obligation to purchase
it.60 Two days after acquiring the Virginia property, Biggs sold the Maryland
tract to Ocean View for an $800,000 installment note, representing the original
selling price of the land without an exchange element. 61
How could anyone pretend that was an exchange? Biggs invested in new
property, through an agent, five months prior to selling the old property for
cash! Even if the agency relationship is ignored, as was done by both courts,6 2
Biggs purchased the new property at least two days before selling the old.
Nevertheless, both the Tax Court 63 and the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit 64 approved section 1031 treatment for Biggs. Significantly, however, the
Tax Court did not rely upon traditional permissible illogic to find a ficticious
exchange; instead, it recognized that the effect of the transaction was continuity of investment, and that was what mattered. 65 The Fifth Circuit performed less admirably.
Tax Court
Judge Simpson, in a delightful opinion, dismissed the Commissioner's
arguments regarding the significance of form, not by pretending, as so many
others might, that the form was correct, but rather by stating that form is not
crucial:
Undue reliance on the form of these transactions frustrates the legislative purpose, that is, to defer recognition of gain or loss in instances in
which the taxpayer continues his investment in property of a like kind.
Undue reliance on form also produces capricious results; in cases which
are not substantively different, courts are led to reach differing results.
On the other hand, if we focus instead on the substance of the transactions, taking into consideration all steps which are part of an integrated plan, we reach results which are consonant with the legislative
purpose and which treat all taxpayers evenhandedly.66
Judge Simpson also clearly explained that he realized cash passed through
58.
59.
60.
They,
Biggs.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

632 F.2d at 1178, 69 T.C. at 917.
Id. at 1175,69 T.C. at9ll-12.
Id. Powell and his transferees also gave Biggs a quitclaim deed to the Virginia land.
too, however, had no interest other than a right to purchase it and later to convey it to
632 F.2d at 1175, 69 T.C. at 912.
Id. at 1178, 69 T.C. at 917.
69 T.C. at 919.
632 F.2d at 1178.
69 T.C. at 918.
Id.
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Biggs' hands; however, he did not care.67 Biggs could have sold the Maryland
land for less money and could have demanded that Ocean View acquire the
Virginia property for him. Such an arrangement would have been more "artful,"'68 but insistence upon it, the judge explained, would have been "to exalt
form over substance.60

Court of Appeals
opinion70

The circuit
is much less helpful. The author of the opinion 1
never quite said whether he realized that Biggs sold for cash; however, his explanation for applying section 1031 indicates that he may have understood
correcly.7 2 If so, his justification is, to say the least, bizarre. The judge discussed, at length, a 1967 Fifth Circuit opinion, Carlton v. Commissioner7s
involving an aborted three-corner deal. The Carlton taxpayer sold property
for cash and the same day-4 purchased replacement property upon which he
had earlier put a $50,000 deposit7 5 The Carlton court denied 1031 treatment
because of bad form: cash went through the taxpayer's hands.70
The Fifth Circuit panel in Biggs distinguished Carlton on the almost
humorous basis that Carlton reinvested funds a few hours after the sale while
Biggs did so a few days before.77 The essence of continuity of investment and
67. Judge Simpson explained that Biggs' receipt of cash was acceptable because it was
not "unfettered or unrestricted." Id. at 919. The remark is, of course, correct since Biggs
spent the money before he ever received it.
68. Id. at 917-18.
69. Id. at 918.
70. 632 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1980).
71. Judges Brown and J. Johnson sat on the panel with Judge Henderson, the author.
Judge Henderson presently sits on the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.
72. The opinion twice discussed Biggs' receipt of cash, 632 F.2d at 1177, 1178; however, in
doing so, the court was contradictory. It first concluded that the cash constituted "boot," id.
at 1177, which, of course would be acceptable under the law, see I.R.C. § 1031(b) (1976).
Three sentences later, however, the court justified the cash, not as boot, but xather because it
was received after rather than before the reinvestment. 632 F.2d at 1177, 1178. The judge's
argument, of course, was that the cash was thus not unrestricted; however, the legal issue
involved in that argument is entirely inconsistent with the prior denomination of the cash
as boot: if the cash were boot, whether it was also unrestricted would be irrelevant. Thus,
one is left merely to wonder about the manner in which the court viewed the cash -the
single most important element of the case.
73. 385 F.2d 238 (5th Cir. 1967).
74. Id. at 240.
75. The court actually said that "the total deposit ... did not exceed . . .fifty thousand
dollars ... .'Id. at 259.
76. Id. at 243.
77. The court said that the "crucial" factor distinguishing Carlton was that the taxpayer
received cash "which [he] then used two days later to purchase the exchange property." 632
F.2d at 1176 (emphasis added). The facts of Carlton, however, were different. The court explained that the transfer of cash occurred on August third. "Later that same day Carlton took
the assignment of the contracts to purchase and purchased the Lyons property, using his
personal check to close the sale. On August 4 he purchased the Fernandez property in a
similar manner." 385 F.2d at 240 (emphasis added). Obviously, the reinvestment occurred
partially a few hours following the sale and partially a day later. Because the court denoted
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integrated plans that Judge Simpson so cogently explained 7s apparently made
little impression on the higher court. The circuit opinion did attempt to claim
that Carlton had unrestricted use of the funds for a few hours while Biggs did
not because he had previously spent the money. 79 How the court could ignore
Carlton's contractual obligation to purchase the replacement property and his
$50,000 deposit, which surely gave him some incentive to spend the money, is
beyond reason. At best it is a return to permissible illogic.
Of Brauer

0

Arthur Brauer arranged. a typical three-corner deal in which he would
transfer his land to an exchange partner in return for land the partner would
have moments before acquired at Brauer's behest. 81 Not atypically, the
partner became nervous because he discovered a defect in the title to the
property he was to acquire for use in the exchange.8 2 Not wanting to see the
deal collapse, Brauer rearranged the plans a la Biggs: the exchange partner 83
would give Brauer cash plus the right to purchase the replacement property,
and Brauer would immediately reinvest the money in the intended asset.84 In
fact, Brauer received title to the replacement property prior to the time he
received the cash. 85 Not unexpectedly, the government was beside itself and
Brauer smartly found his way to the Tax Court.
In the spirit of Biggs, but in a less clear opinion, Judge Drennen said that
Brauerfit within section 1031: "this transfer and receipt 'were interdependent
parts of an overall plan' ....Given, under Biggs, that substance should control,
the only reasonable conclusion is that an exchange was effected."8' 8 In analyzing
the rationale for section 1031,87 the judge quoted some very interesting language from a 1974 Tax Court opinion 8s which in turn quoted the 1939 House

Carlton's unrestricted use of cash for two days as a crucial factor, its misreading of Carlton
is most distressing. The court relied so heavily on Biggs' "simultaneous" reinvestment as
contrasted to Carlton's two days, that one wonders how the Biggs decision would have differed
if the court had properly understood Carlton.
In fairnesss to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, the court was not alone in its
misreading of Carlton. The Tax Court in Biggs made precisely the same error. 69 T.C. at 91.
78. 69 T.C. at 914, 918.
79. 632 F.2d at 1177.
80. Brauer v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 1134 (1980).
81. Id. at 1135-36.
82. Id. at 1137.
83. Actually two escrow agents were involved to receive cash; however, since they transferred the money directly to Brauer rather than to the seller of the replacement property, the
agents' roles were unimportant. See id. at 1137-38.
84. Brauer neither received currency nor did he deposit cash into an account. Instead, he
merely had endorsed in his favor a certified check which he then immediately negotiated to
the seller of the replacement property. Id. at 1138.
85. Id. at 1138 n.3.
86. Id. at 1145 (emphasis added).
87. Id. at 1144 n.7.
88. Koch v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 54, 63-64 (1978). Koch was also cited and quoted by
the Tax Court in Biggs, 69 T.C. at 913.
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Report 89 accompanying the predecessor 9° to section 1031:
The basic reason for allowing nonrecognition of gain or loss on the exchange of like-kind property is that the taxpayer's economic situation
after the exchange is fundamentally the same as it was before the transaction occurred. '[I]f the taxpayer's money is still tied up in the same
kind of property as that in which it was originally invested, he is not
allowed to compute and deduct his theoretical loss on the exchange, nor
is he charged with a tax upon his theoretical profit.' 91
Unlike the Fifth Circuit Biggs panel, the Brauer court did not attach any
significance to Brauer's having received the replacement property before the
sale.9 2 As indicated above, the judge, like Judge Simpson in Biggs, found importance in the interdependence of the transfer and receipt. As did Simpson,
he rejected the Commissioner's suggestion that "contractual interdependence"
is necessary and instead required that the transactions be "interdependent
parts of an overall plan."98
At first reading the prior statement is very confusing - "contractual interdependence" and "interdependent parts" might appear to be the same thing;
but they are not. The court did not insist that a single contract have as its
terms the sale, the purchase, and the reinvestment. Similarly, it did not require a contract which would fail in all respects upon the failure of a single
part. Instead, it only asked that there be a plan for continuity, that the reinvestment be an important part of the plan, and that the plan be fulfilled.
Whether it required immediate reinvestment is unclear.
OF CRrncIsM
Both Tax Court opinions - Biggs and Brauer- are so helpful and novel
that one hesitates to complain. Nevertheless, with a bit more frankness regarding the change, both judges could have forced the recognition their arguments
deserve. As written, both opinions are sufficiently bland that -they can be safely
and quietly ignored. 94 Three areas, applicable to both cases, are disappointing:
(1) the misuse of jurisprudence; (2) the persistence of the agent-who-is-not-anagent; and (3) the incomplete use of congressional motive.
Of the Misuse of Jurisprudence
Brauer
Both judges demonstrated significant leadership in rejecting the form over
substance notion. Unfortunately, each diluted his effectiveness by downplaying
89. H.R. REP. No. 704, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1934).
90. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 112(b)(1) (repealed 1954).
91. 74 T.C. at 1144 n.7.
92. The court volunteered this fact in a footnote, but never mentioned it in the list of
unimportant or crucial factors. Id. at 1138 n.3.
93. Id. at 1143-44 (quotingBiggs, 69 T.C. at914).
94. The later cases of Swaim v. United States, 651 F.2d 1066 (5th Cir. 1981). and Milbrew,
Inc. v. Commissioner, 42 T.C.M. (CClt) 1467 (1981) largely ignored the progress made by
Biggs and Brauer. See infra text accompanying notes 136-71.
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the change and by attempting to justify his position with questionable precedent. Of the two, Judge Drennen, in Brauer, seemed to have the greater need
to rely upon prior decisions:
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, the circuit court to which this
case would normally be appealable, has also emphasized substance over
form in section 1031 cases. See Smith v. Commissioner, 537 F.2d 972 (8th
Cir. 1976), aff'g. a Memorandum Opinion of this Court; Century Electric
Co. v. Commissioner, 192 F.2d 155 (8th Cir. 1951), affg. 15 T.C. 581
(1950), cert. denied 342 U.S. 954 (1952). 95
The court's statement is of course correct, but it is also misleading. In both
Smith 96 and Century Electric,9 7 the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
followed the substance over form doctrine; however, in both cases the argument was advanced by the government. For many years the Commissioner has
been allowed to assert the substance of a transaction when a taxpayer's choice
of form has been particularly offensive.98 Allowing such a right to the taxpayer,
however, is novel; 99 thus the court fails to help its argument by pretending to
find support in cases permitting the government argument. At best those cases
are generally analagous and should have been more clearly presented as such.
Most puzzling is the court's use of Smith at all. In that case, a taxpayer
owned two parcels, one with a high basis, tract A, and one with a low basis,
tract B. He wanted to sell tract B to his brother but feared recognition of substantial gain. Ingeniously, he sold tract A to his brother for cash and then exchanged tract B for tract A.:00 Naturally, the court denied section 1031 treatment because the substance of the deal was a mere sale of tract B.10 ' Smith is
surely correct and is backed by weighty authority. It, however, does not aid
Arthur Brauer's argument and citation to it, other than as an analogy, weakens
the case by focusing attention away from its true strength: logic. Instead, the
court lessened its impact by claiming to follow such non-existent precedent
0 2
under the Golson rule.
Biggs
The Biggs court was more open in its recognition of its own leadership,203
95. 74 T.C. at 1144.
96. 537 F.2d at 975.
97. 192 F.2d at 159. Interestingly, the court used the substance over form doctrine to find
that an exchange, rather than a sale, had occurred. Id.
98. See supra note 44.
99. But see Alderson v. Commissioner, 317 F.2d 790 (9th Cir. 1963); supra note 44.
100. 537 F.2d at 974.
101. Id. at 975.
102. Golsen v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 742 (1970), aff'd on other grounds, 445 F.2d 985
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 940 (1971), requires the Tax Court to follow decisions of the
Court of Appeals to which the pending case is appealable.
103. The court criticizes prior cases and cites to critical commentary. It notes: "Such an
emphasis on the form in which the transaction is cast has been the object of criticism among
commentators and has led an appellate court to observe that the cases in this area are 'hopelessly conflicting.'" 69 T.C. at 918 (citations omitted).
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but it still felt the need to distinguish rather than openly disagree with earlier
cases. For example, Judge Simpson, as later did the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit,' ° 4 distinguished Carlton'0 5 on a factual basis rather than upon a
change in legal philosophylO0 If nothing else, the judge's refusal to criticize
the prior case lessens the value of his decision as a pedagogical tool.
Of Agents-Who-Are-Not-Agents, Revisited
Why bother? Prior courts ignored the reality of an agency relationship because doing so allowed them to pretend that a literal exchange occurred when
in reality it had not. 07 Otherwise, those courts would have harshly treated
taxpayers who in fact fulfilled congressional intent with a continuity of investment. Once Biggs and Brauer got beyond the mistaken need for a literal
exchange, the existence or non-existence of an agency relationship should have
been irrelevant. Who bought the property and how it was financed are immaterial when the focus is on continuity and interdependence; thus, continuing
the non-agency pretense serves no purpose and damages the opinions' credibilities. The cases would be more helpful if Judges Simpson and Drennen had
each said, "Yes, the taxpayer acted through an agent but it does not matter
because he could have acted directly."
Of CongressionalMotive
Much has been said regarding whether Congress intended the literal exchange requirement of section 1031.108 Little doubt remains that it did: not
only is the word "exchange" plainly in the statute but the congressional debate
also provides irrefutable evidence that at least some members of Congress foresaw a literal exchange involving no cash. 0 9 That cannot be denied, but unfortunately Biggs and Brauerdo not face the issue head-on.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

632 .2d at 1176.
See supra text accompanying notes 73-79.
74 T.C. at 918-19.
See supra text accompanying notes 21-29.
See, e.g., Guerin, supra note 6, at 557-60.
The following discussion occurred on the floor of the House of Representatives be-

tween Congressman LaGuardia and Congressman Green, then chairman of the Committee on
Ways and Means, regarding § 203(b)(i) of the Revenue Act of 1924, a predecessor of I.R.C.

§ 1031:
Mr. LaGuardia. Under this paragraph is it necessary to exchange the property? Suppose

the property is sold and other property immediately acquired for the same business.
Would that be a gain or loss, assuming there is greater value in the property acquired?
Mr. Green of Iowa. If the property is reduced to cash and there is a gain, of course it will
be taxed.
Mr. LaGuardia. Suppose that cash is immediately put back into the property, into the
business?
Mr. Green of Iowa. That would not make any difference.
65 CONG. REC. 2799 (1924). This discussion was relied upon by the Tax Court in Alderson v.
Commissioner, 38 T.C. 215, 220 n.3 (1962), rev'd, 317 F.2d 790 (5th Cir. 1963). For a discussion

of the Fifth Circuit reversal in Alderson, see supra note 44.
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What must be understood, and what the courts should have explained, is
that there is more to congressional intent than the mere choice of a word or
the choice of form to implement policy. When the intent of a statute becomes
important, as it has become because of the harshness of section 1031, the policy
and motive behind the words, rather than the mere choice of the words themselves, should be paramount. The Supreme Court of the United States said in
0
Ozawa v. United States:"
It is the duty of this Court to give effect to the intent of Congress. Primarily this intent is ascertained by giving the words their natural significance, but if this leads to an unreasonable result plainly at variance
with the policy of the legislation as a whole, we must examine the matter
further. We may then look to the reason of the enactment and inquire
into its antecedent history and give it effect in accordance with its design
and purpose, sacrificing, if necessary, the literal meaning in order that
the purpose may not fail.'."
Both Biggs"2 and Brauer"3 at least touch upon purpose: Congress meant to
forego recognition if there is continuity of investment. It chose the form of
exchange merely as a way of implementing that purpose. Many authorities
complain that to ignore that clear choice is to render the word exchange insignificant or meaningless. 1 4 The message of Biggs and Brauer, which should
have been shouted, is that the word exchange became insignificant and lost all
meaning many years ago1 5 -- ever since it became so harsh to apply.1"0
Congress meant not to impose some arbitrary rule, but rather to leave untouched an uninterrupted investment. While it chose an unfortunate rule to7
implement that intention, its motive remains and must not be overlooked."
To give undue importance to that rule is to raise the implementation of policy
above the policy itself."l8 In this instance it is also to do an injustice." 9 The
Supreme Court of New York remarked most eloquently in 1818:
[A] thing which is within the intention of the makers of a statute is as
much within the statute as if it were within the letter, and a thing which
is within the letter of a statute, is20not within the statute, unless it is
within the intention of the makers.
110. 260 U.S. 178 (1922) (a non-tax case dealing with the naturalization of aliens).
111. Id. at 194, quoted in Helvering v. New York Trust, 292 U.S. 455, 464 (1934) (dealing
with the Revenue Act of 1921). Note the very limited use the Court makes of intent: it is
relevant only when a literal reading is both unreasonable and at variance with the policy of
the legislation as a whole.
112. 69 T.C. at 918.
113. 74 T.C. at 1144 n.7.
114. E.g., Swaim v. United States, 651 F.2d 1066, 1071 (5th Cir. 1981); Carlton v. United
States, 385 F.2d 238, 243 (5th Cir. 1968); Guerin, supra note 6, at 632.
115. See supra text accompanying notes 19-36.
116. See supranote 2.
117. See Biggs, 69 T.C. at 918. See supra text accompanying note 66.
Biggs, 69 T.C. at
118. "[Ujndue reliance on form frustrates the legislative purpose ...
918.
119. "Undue reliance on form also produces capricious results .... ." Id.
120. People v. Utica Ins. Co., 15 Johns. 358, 381 (N.Y. 1818). This language has been
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While the statement may be broad,21 it is at least true when the form provided
by a statute, such as that in section 1031, has become unfair. Biggs and Brauer
would have better fulfilled their missions if they had relied more upon such
arguments of congressional intent and less upon non-existent precedent.
OF R:EGRssIoN

As indicated earlier, the leadership shown by the court in Biggs and Brauer
was not to last: the Tax Court cases of Barker122 and Milbrew12s and the Fifth
Circuit decision of Swaim' 24 represent regression. This readherence to the
sanctity of form is certainly unfortunate; however, more distressing is the
judiciary's consistent ability to ignore its own decisions and to pretend they say
what they do not say. Just as Biggs and Brauer inadequately proclaimed their
own leadership, the more recent decisions failed to proclaim their own reversion.

Of Barker
The facts, as is customary with section 1081 cases, are needlessly complex the result not of economic necessity, but rather of jurisprudential formalities.
Four parties were involved: 2 5 Barker, an exchange partner, an unrelated seller,
and an escrow agent (who-was-not-an-agent).126 Since all parts of the transaction were conducted through the non-agent, Barker successfully insulated
himself12 from cash and was permitted the benefit of 1031.128
Judge Nims was obviously pleased with the complexity. He managed
articulately, if unconvincingly, to explain how adherence to form is mandated
by the Code:
To the complaint that this treatment places undue emphasis on a
formalistic step of no substance, we repeat what we have already said;
that the conceptual distinction between an exchange qualifying for secquoted three times in tax cases. Helvering v. New York Trust, 292 U.S. 455, 464-65 (1933);
Dewbury v. United States, 146 F. Supp. 467, 470 (Ct. Cl. 1956); Chester A. Weaver Co. v.
Commissioner, 35 B.T.A. 514,521 (1937) (Smith, J., dissenting).
121. With all due respect to the judges of the New York court, the philosophy they
articulate, while profound, is not original to them, but rather emanates from higher authority:
"for the written code kills, but the Spirit gives life." 2 Corinthians 3:6 (Revised Std. Ed. 1901).

122. Barker v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 555 (1980).
123. Milbrew Inc. v. Commissioner, 42 T.C.M. (CCH) 1467 (1981).
124. Swaim v. United States, 651 F.2d 1066 (1981).
125.

74 T.C. at 566-60.

126. Id. at 565 n.4. The Commissioner did not argue that the agent was an agent,
perhaps because he has traditionally lost the argument. See authorities cited supra note 28.
But see Rev. Rul. 291, 1975-2 C.B. 332. Judge Nims, in Barker, nevertheless raises the issue
that the escrow agent's participation "could be viewed as nothing more than an unnecessary
and formalistic step of no legal or economic significance which should be ignored in determining the character of the transaction for tax purposes." 74 T.C. at 565. He concluded,
however, that no evidence existed showing that the escrow agent was Barker's agent. Id. at
n.4.
127. See id.at 568.
128. Id.
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tion 1031 on the one
hand and a sale and reinvestment on the other is
12
largely one of form. 1
But how could he cite Biggs on seven occasions 130 without at least once admitting that it stood for a markedly different proposition?
Of course the same criticism applies to Judge Drennen in Brauer, a decision
which followed Barker by 85 days 13 ' and emanated from the same court. How
133
agree
could he mention Barker eight times,' 2 quote the above language,
3 5
4
s
Apparently illogic preand then reach the decision he reached?
with it,

vails.
Of Swaim
Exactly what happened is difficult to discern from a mere reading of the
case because the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit failed to mention the
most important fact: when the money changed hands."s5 A perusal of the
briefs, 37 however, supplies the missing evidence. With that information, the
facts are not difficult.
Swaim planned a simple two-party exchange pursuant to section 1031,138
with boot flowing to his exchange partner. 139 Problems arose because the
4o
partner was unable to provide clear title by the intended transfer date.1
Rather than delay the entire transaction, Swaim transferred his property in
return for: (1) cash, (2) a note and (3) the assumption of a mortgage. Crucially,
Swaim intended to, and was contractually obligated to, purchase like-kind
property from his exchange partner for a greater sum of both money and notes
than he had received.' 4' Ultimately, three months14 2 after the "sale", Swaim
129. Id. at 565-66.
130. See supra note 48.
181. The Barker decision was filed on June 10, 1980, while Brauer was filed on September
3, 1980. Both appear in volume 74 of the United States Tax Court Reports.
132. 74 T.C. at 1141, 1145 (five times), 1146 (twice).
1n. Id. at 1145.
184. Id.
135. judge Nims, in Barker, explicitly found to be crucial the fact that Barker could not
and did not receive cash. 74 T.C. at 567-68. In contrast, Judge Drennen was more concerned
that although Brauer received and endorsed the checks, he held them only momentarily and
thus "never exercised control over them since the circumstances of the closing required that
the checks be endorsed to the escrow agent." Id. at 1146 (emphasis added). The difference
in substance is, of course, non-existent; the difference in form, however, is paramount. Thus,
Judge Drennen's argument that Barker and Brauer are reconcilable, id. at 1145-46, is
difficult to understand, since Barker preached reliance upon form, id. at 566.
136. The court described the transactions as "completed" but did not say when the cash
aspects occurred. 651 F.2d at 1068 (1981).
137. Reply Brief for Appellant at 9, Swaim v. United States, 651 F.2d 1066 (5th Cir. 1981).
138. 651 F.2d at 1070.
139. Rather than have a net amount of cash and notes flow from Swaim to his partner,
the parties contracted to exchange cash and notes in the form of two sales, id. at 1068.
The effect, however, was an exchange with a net amount of boot to flow to the partner.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Three days after the "sale" by Swaim, the partner transferred to Swaim temporary
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completed the plan by "purchasing" the replacement property with cash and a
note.
In analyzing the transaction, the court 143 began admirably. It described

congressional intent as applying section 1031 "when in theory the taxpayer may
have realized gain or loss, but in substance his economic interest in the property has remained virtually unchanged by the transaction."' 44 It then explained
how other courts have allowed taxpayers "wide latitude" in section 1031 deals
145
and topped the discussion with a citation to the Biggs Tax Court decision.
At his finest, the judge attempted to explain how cash itself is not an evil;
instead, he told us, it is the receipt of unrestricted cash that is to be avoided:
'Weplaced particular emphasis on whether the cash was earmarked for the
subsequent purchase, noting that the receipt of money which is unfettered or
1 46
unrestrained signifies a sale of the property."
From there it was all downhill. In a purely factual determination, the
court concluded that Swaim was not obligated to purchase the replacement
47
Sigproperty because the contract requiring him to do so was conditional.
were
Swaim
if
differentwere
the
facts
if
nificantly the judge indicated that
truly obligated to spend the money he received - then the result would also
be different and section 1031 would apply. 143 Apparently, the three month
delay involved did not and would not worry the court. 49
The major problems with this case- and I emphasize major -involve its
poor use of jurisprudence and its failure to explain the "contractual interdependence" doctrine, upon which it relies.
Use of Jurisprudence
The court cited its own affirmance of Biggs regarding substance over form
and appeared to agree with it;50 however, the court also cited Barker and
Carlton favorably.' 51 Since the decisions are not reconcilable, the court should
have explained, or at least admitted, its reliance upon opposing theories. Instead, and in the spirit of too many prior cases, 52 the judge disappointingly
deeds for the replacement property. Swaim chose not to record these deeds because of unperformed contractual conditions, and the court chose to disregard the transfer. Id. at 1068,

1071 n.7.
143. Judges Wisdom and J. Johnson joined Judge Politz, the author of the opinion, on
the panel. All three remain on the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit following the split
with the new Eleventh Circuit.
144. 651 F.2d at 1068 (citing Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Tomlinson, 399 F.2d 652, 665 (5th
Cir. 1968).

145. Id. at 1070.
146. Id. The court was referring to the Carlton decision; however, it appeared to apply
the same standard to the instant case.
147. Id. at 1071 n.7.
148. Id. at 1070-71.
149. The court did not state as much, but this conclusion is a negative pregnant of the
language quoted in supra text accompanying note 145.
150. 651 F.2d at 1070.
151. Id.at 1070, 1071.
152. See supra notes 1, 2 & 7.
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referred to Henderson Clay Products1 53 and the supposed harshness, inequities,
and inconsistencies in tax law.?54
In a remarkable misuse of a prior decision, the court relied upon Redwing
Carriers,Inc. v. Tomlinson, 55 a 1969 Fifth Circuit opinion, to justify using the
"contractual interdependence" doctrine. "5 Granted Redwing applied the
doctrine; 157 however, it used the theory to impose section 1031 treatment upon
a taxpayer who tried to avoid the section. Redwing told us that if a taxpayer's
plans for sale were contractually interdependent with his plans for reinvestment of the proceeds, then section 1031 must apply, regardless of the form the
taxpayer chose. 158 The Swaim court could have stated that the same rule should
apply to taxpayers urging the application of 1031 as applies to those attempting
to avoid it, i.e., that a taxpayer must always prove contractual interdependence
in order to utilize section 1031. Such a statement, if based upon an asserted
need for consistency in tax law, would at least be logical, if not wise; however,
it would also signal a clear change. The Swaim court, unfortunately, imposed
the Redwing theory upon all taxpayers, not out of a sense of logic, but rather
out of an irresistable urge to follow precedent. Its implication that Redwing
historically applies to all taxpayers is not only incorrect, but it also casts doubt
upon the court's understanding of the significance its decision represents, and
consequently upon the decision itself.
Explanation of the Contractual
Interdependence Doctrine
As indicated earlier, the "contractual interdependence" and the "interdependent parts" doctrines are distinct - the former requires that all parts of
a plan must fail if any one of them fails, while the latter doctrine merely requires that all steps be parts of a single plan, the parts of which are intended
but not required to reach fruition together. 5 9 Redwing Carriers clearly spoke
of contractual interdependence. 60 The Tax Court, in Biggs, affirmed by the
Fifth Circuit, rejected that doctrine as a requirement and instead adopted the
interdependent parts theory'' for taxpayers choosing to apply section 1031
Brauerfollowed suit.162
153. 324 F.2d 7 (5th Cir. 1962). See supra note 1.
154. 651 F.2d at 1071.
155. 399 F.2d 652 (5th Cir. 1968).
156. 651 F.2d at 1071.
157. 399 F.2d at 655, 659.
158. Id. Redwing spoke broadly and indicated that it would apply its holding to all
taxpayers seeking to avoid I.R.C. § 1031. Id. at 656. Specifically, however, the court dealt with
Treas. Reg. § 1.103(a)-l(c) and a taxpayer attempt to avoid § 1031 treatment on an exchange
of trucks. Id. at 656-57.
159. See supra text accompanying note 93.
160. 399 F.2d at 655, 659. The court used the doctrine to impose I.R.C. § 1031 treatment
upon a taxpayer who did not desire it. Naturally, finding that contractual interdependence
is sufficient to result in § 1031 application is different from saying that it is necessary. The Tax
Court in Biggs and Brauer understood the distinction, Biggs, 69 T.C. at 914, Brauer,74 T.C.
at 1143; unfortunately, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in Swaim, did not,
161. 69 T.C. at 914.
162. See 74 T.C. at 1143.
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Swaim, unfortunately, is unclear. As stated above, the Fifth Circuit panel
163
claimed to follow contractual interdependence, relying upon Redwing,
without explaining why it did not follow the more recent opinion, Biggs, of a
different Fifth Circuit panel. The panel also cited Biggs, favorably, without
explaining the contradiction.More puzzling is the court's explanation of the doctrine. The judges were
disturbed by Swaim's receipt of cash without there being an enforceable contract requiring him to reinvest the money. 65 That is a fine thing to be disturbed
about, but it is an element of the interdependent parts doctrine, not of contractual interdependence. This is true because interdependent parts requires
that there be a series of actual contracts, but not that they be mutually dependent. Under Biggs, a judge would thus correctly be concerned with the
existence of a valid contract to reinvest; however, under Redwing, which
Swaim purports to follow, the judges should have been more disturbed by the
fact that the other parts of the plan would not fail if the reinvestment failed.
While this criticism may appear to be overly technical, actually it is fundamental. The court claimed to follow an old doctrine without explaining that it
was rejecting a more current one,' 66 and then it proceeded to describe the old
doctrine as if it were applying the new. As a result, the bar can only guess
which way the judiciary is attempting to lead.

Of Milbrew'

67

This case is a lengthy memorandum decision of which only eight paragraphs are devoted to section 1031.l s Normally such an opinion would be
duplicative of prior cases and thus not deserving of attention; however, this
one is different because of the manner in which it applied the interdependent
parts doctrine.
The taxpayers followed a plan by which they sold property for a cashiers
check which they immediately endorsed in order to purchase replacement
property. 6 9 Unfortunately, the court did not explain whether the taxpayers
were previously obligated to purchase the new property; however, it described
the reinvestment as "immediate" albeit "independent." Since the repurchase
was immediate, the taxpayers must have planned it in advance; therefore, the
facts were almost identical to the ones which Brauer approved as being interdependent parts of an overall plan although they were not contractually interdependent. 70 The court in Milbrew, however, asserted that the interdependent
163. 651 F.2d at 1071.
164. Id. at 1070.
165. See id. at 1071.
166. I would never criticize a court for merely treading new ground; however, under the
doctrine of jurisprudence constante, the court should at least acknowledge that it is doing so.
See supra text accompanying note 18.
167. Milbrew, Inc. v. Commissioner, 42 T.C.M. (CCH) 1467 (1981).
168. Id. at 1479, 1489-90.
169. Id.
170. See 74 T.C. at 1148-44. The Brauer facts had even more "immediacy" since Brauer
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In doing so, it cited Biggs twice, but never even

mentioned Brauer. As a result, further doubt has arisen regarding what the
interdependent parts test really means, and whether the courts will apply it
consistently.
CONCLUSION

Where the "caselaw" presently stands with respect to section 1031 is easy
to describe: a mess. Biggs and Brauer demonstrated almost courageous leadership. They were then promptly and thoroughly ignored by judges sitting on
the very same courts that wrote them Perhaps the following suggestions will
lend some element of logic to such a system in which courts deliberately act
harshly and inequitably - a system infected by permissible illogic.
First, let's admit that the word exchange is now meaningless with regard
to section 1031. It was a nice thought that Congress had, but it does not now
work. Generally, it is easily avoided; however, in those instances in which it is
not avoided, it becomes harsh, inequitable, and unfair. Thus, it should be
ignored until it is replaced. Alderson in 1963, Biggs in 1978, and Brauer in
1980 did just that. They should be followed - not because they are precedent
but because they are correct.
Second, let's get rid of the agency nonsense. Admittedly courts use it to
rescue taxpayers who have been poorly advised; but, however admirable it may
be, the theory is also logically indefensible and, crucially, one which would be
unnecessary if courts were to utilize one of the following alternative theories,
which are suggested in ascending order of attractiveness.
Theory One
Discontinue the jurisprudential escape hatches - such as the agency theory
which have no statutory basis but which partially alleviate the arbitrariness
of section 1031. In conjunction, enforce the statute literally. The result would
be harsher, more inequitable, and more unfair than the present system, but it
would also be logical and consistent. More importantly, it might speed needed
congressional action. As many have said, often the quickest way to change a
bad law is to enforce it.
-

Theory Two (A FarBetter Approach)
Follow recognized civilian equitable notions that permit a court to ignore
a statute which is meaningless, harsh, and inconsistent with legislative intent.
Such an approach could at least allow cash to flow through the taxpayer's hands
if it is reinvested immediately - the same day - pursuant to a contract arranged
in advance. This would fulfill the congressional desire for continuity of investment with minimum delay but would also relieve us of the need for the
non-agency theory and the myriad of paper transactions -which presently
achieve precisely the same result (when they work).
received the replacement property before he received the cash; however, the court did not
seem to consider that fact crucial. Id.
171. 42 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1490.
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A straight Starker deal would be allowable under this theory, as it is now,
because Starker does not properly raise a section 1031 issue 7 2 A modified
Starker- with a secured promise or escrow account - would not be allowable
because of the time-lag involved, something which Congress apparently chose
not to allow.173 This theory is clearly supported by Alderson, Biggs, and
Brauer,and perhaps by Swaim,1 74 each of which recognized the problems with
section 1031 and at least partially chose to ignore its literal requirements.
Theory Three (Better Still)
Proceed beyond traditional civilian notions of minimum judicial interference and ignore the word exchange completely - not only the form element
but also the element of minimal delay. This theory would retain only the
element of continuity - the primary congressional motive - and would allow
cash to flow through the taxpayer's hands, with no time limit upon the reinvestment, if the following conditions are met:
1. Intent and Plan. Throughout the transaction, from the original
receipt of cash until the reinvestment, the taxpayer must have the
intent to effect a continuity of investment, and a plan to accomplish
that intent.
2. Contract. As part of the plan, the taxpayer must have a contractual
obligation to purchase specific property.
3. Fruition.The actual plan, as originally intended, must be fulfilled
involving the originally intended property.
Basically, this suggestion is the "interdependent parts" doctrine, with the
specific statement that time does not matter. A modified Starker deal, however,
would not fit within this proposal because it would represent a discontinuous
investment.
Without doubt, this theory, under present law, is revolutionary and is not
dearly supported by any jurisprudence; however, it is less arbitrary than
Theory Two and more accurately fulfills congressional spirit if not the letter
of the law.
Theory Four(Best)
By all means, Congress, as has been suggested elsewhere, should tell us how
much time can be involved: one day (for maximum continuity), 90 days (to
allow for obvious practical problems), or perhaps a year or more (as per
sections 1033 and 1034).
172. See supra text accompanying note 32.
173.

Id. See supra notes 30-35.

I recognize that many commentators have written that Congress did not require simultaneity in I.R.C. § 1031, see supra note 30; however, they did so out of a mistaken belief that
I.R.C. § 1031 applies to the time-lag in a straight Starker deal, see supra note 32. In the text
I refer to the time-lag in a modified Starker - a time-lag involving economic benefit - something Congress clearly meant to avoid by choosing a policy of continuity.
174. See supra text accompanying note 148.
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EPILOGUE

Whatever proposal is followed - one of the above or any other - something
should be done with regard to section 1031, even if all we do is fully return to
permissable illogic. Requiring attorneys to jump through hoops is not so
unusual; someone, however, should at least tell them which hoops are involved.
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